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| Hazard Analysis Projects |
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Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. has conducted numerous hazard analyses and evaluations for various clients. Descriptions of these projects are listed in the following paragraphs: 1.Black Powder Substitute Process System and Facility Hazards Analysis 2.New Blend Facility Hazard Analysis 3.Hazard Analysis of the Quality Control and Ballistics Range Operations 4.Pharmaceutical Plant Operation Hazards Evaluation 5.Hazard Analysis of Ball Powder Process Plant 6.Hazard Evaluation of Hooker Resource Recovery Facility 7.M204/M205 Igniter Increment Lap Line Hazard Analysis 8.170-155 Propellant Weigh Scale System 9.HAP/OTTO Fuel Safety Test Program 10.Safety Analyses & Hazard Evaluation for the 15 mm, M549/8 Inch M650 Process Equipment 11.1.5 Classification Testing of Insensitive Explosives for Hazard Division 1.5, U.S. Air Force 12.Viper Production Plant Containment Vessel and Shield Design Analysis 13.Hazard Analysis for Sargent York XM766 Fuze Production Facility (1984) 14.Equipment Hazard Analysis in Assembly and Loading XM130 Rocket Production Facility (1983) 15.Preliminary Hazard Analysis for JAAP Loading Lines (1983) 16.Hazards Classification Tests on PBHA-1 Explosive Material (1982) 17.Explosion Output Analysis of Primary and Adjacent Structures (1981) 18.Preliminary Hazard Analysis for MLRS Production Facility (1981) 19.Engineering Hazard Analysis of the Wolverine Belt Dryer Design 20.Continuous Process Eak Explosive Manufacturing Facility Subsystem Hazard Analysis - Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, Maryland (1984) 21.155mm/8-inch Center Core Charger Facility Total System Hazard Analysis - Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, Charlestown, Indiana (1986) 22.Lithium Battery Test Facility - Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, Indiana (1986) 23.Air Conveying Systems 24.Hazard Evaluation Consultation for Air Conveying Cellulose Acetate 25.Preliminary Hazard Analysis for Case Reclamation Facility - Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, Maryland, (1986) 26.Determine Alternate Techniques to Detonate Chemical Filled 155mm Projectiles - Us Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (1980) 27.Preliminary Hazard Analysis Ont He Fort Wadsworth Naval Station - Fort Wadsworth Naval Station, New York (1986) 28.Lithium Battery Facility Blast Design Analysis 29.Lithium Battery Test Facility Preliminary Hazard Analysis 30.Blast Resistance Study for Primary Shredders and Fuel Storage Bin 31.Lithium Boiler Hazard Analysis 1. BLACK POWDER SUBSTITUTE PROCESS SYSTEM AND FACILITY HAZARD ANALYSIS Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. was responsible for conducting hazard analyses and evaluations of the complete process plant and its associated facilities during the design and construction phases of this effort. Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. worked closely with the architectural and engineering firm to maintain maximum safety in the design and construction of the facility. Hazard analyses of the following subsystems were obtained during the project effort:
In addition to the consulting engineering efforts listed above, numerous hazard tests were conducted to determine the hazard levels and ignition sensitivities of hazardous materials in the process. Explosion output tests were made to determine the adequacy of building and equipment containments. 2. NEW BLEND FACILITY HAZARD ANALYSIS Hazard analysis consulting engineering efforts were undertaken for Olin Corporation at St. Marks, Florida. Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. conducted consulting engineering efforts during the process design and facility design efforts. Evaluations to determine hazards of fire and explosion events and personnel injury related accidents were conducted. Equipment designs, performance characteristics, explosion events and personnel injury related accidents were examined. Equipment designs, performance characteristics, explosion containment and venting capabilities and facilities, building containment and venting were evaluated. On-site inspections of the buildings and equipment were also conducted. Extensive evaluations of pneumatic conveying of hazardous chemicals were performed in this effort. The safety and hazard evaluation recommendations were incorporated into the facility design and the equipment designs. In addition to the above hazard evaluation, extensive hazards tests were conducted at the Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. facilities to determine the propagation characteristics of fires and explosions in air conveying systems. Tests were run to determine the responsiveness of infrared and pressure sensors to the onset of fire and explosions in contained air conveying systems. Tests were also conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of blow-away vent panels on the air conveying systems. Duct work and cyclone blowout and fragmentation characteristics were also evaluated. 3. HAZARD ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITY CONTROL AND BALLISTICS RANGE OPERATIONS Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. conducted the safety and hazard analysis for Olin Corporation, St. Marks, Florida on the above operations. This effort entailed conducting failure modes and effects analyses on all operations related to the above processes. Hazard and safety evaluations of the operations were conducted to determine potential personnel injuries/fatalities and equipment facilities damage. In this effort, on-site inspections were made to pinpoint hazards and safety problems associated with the operations. In addition, noise surveys were conducted of the ballistics test area to be sure that adequate ear protection was being maintained. Sampling and identifications of various in-process materials were conducted to determine the degree of hazard to the operations. Recommendations were made for changes in the facility, equipment, standard operating procedures, human factors interrelationships, personnel protection, containment and venting of hazardous material operations. In addition to the above consulting engineering effort, hazard testing work was conducted on materials found in processes relative to their initiation thresholds and explosion/fire output characteristics. 4. PHARMACEUTICAL PLANT OPERATION HAZARDS EVALUATION Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. conducted a hazards safety evaluation of the pharmaceutical product formulation and handling operation. A review of fire suppression systems effectiveness and responsiveness was made in this effort. Also, evaluations of dust explosibility and consequences in the operations were also analyzed. Pneumatic conveying systems for handling base material and dust collection systems were evaluated to determine whether fires and explosions could occur or propagate to these systems. On-site measurements were made of electrostatic charging and stored energies in the air handling and bulk powder handling operations. As a result of this effort, recommendations to maximize personnel safety, prevent dust fires and explosions in various operations, and modifications to bag houses, air handling systems, and machinery for handling bulk powders were made. 5. HAZARD ANALYSIS OF BALL POWDER PROCESS PLANT Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. conducted a hazards and safety analysis of the entire operation required to manufacture ball powder. Explosion and fire hazards were evaluated for each of the process steps. The overall process system was evaluated for determining safety compliance to OSHA standards and for noise compliance to OSHA standards. On-site inspections were conducted to pinpoint all potential equipment, people and facilities, interfaces, and other normal and abnormal environments and stress conditions. In conclusion of the effort, recommendations were made to provide improved personnel protection (e.g.breathing apparatus, head protection, ear plugs, and face shields). Recommendations for the modification of equipment and facility layouts were made to improve the overall operation safety. In addition, recommended changes in personnel interfaces and standard operating procedures were made. 6. HAZARD EVALUATION OF HOOKER RESOURCE RECOVERY FACILITY Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. conducted an explosive hazard evaluation on the shredders and affected equipment in the Hooker Resource Recovery Facility, to be sure that all explosion hazards have been identified, addressed, and that the facility will be operating under maximum safety considerations in case of potential incidents in the shredders. Explosion and fire hazards were evaluated to determine the explosive condition (type, overpressure level, etc.) that would cause a shredder rupture and evaluations were made of the implication of such an occurrence to facility and personnel. Recommendations were made to provide improved personnel protection (e.g. breathing apparatus, head protection, ear plugs, face shields, firewalls, and high-speed sprinklers), and how to implement these devises into the process. In addition, recommended changes in personnel interfaces and standard operating procedures were made. 7. M204/M205 IGNITER INCREMENT LAP LINE HAZARD ANALYSIS A hazard and risk analysis was performed on the entire process system for loading igniter increments with M10 propellant. A complete series of material response tests were conducted on the hazardous materials. Critical hazards were identified and recommendations were made to bring all identified hazards into acceptable levels - per requirements of PBM OSM 385-1, MIL-STD-88SA, and ARRADCOM Reg. 385-4. 8. 170-155 PROPELLANT WEIGH SCALE SYSTEM A hazards and risk analysis was performed on a Netweigh/Checkweigh propellant weigh propellant weigh system for loading propellant increments for the 105 through 155 propellant changes. A complete series of material response testing was performed on M1, M6, M30A1, and M31A1 propellants. Numerous hazards were identified and recommendations were made to bring them into acceptable levels. The hazard analysis was conducted for PBM OSM 385-1, MIL-STD-882A, and ARRADCOM Reg. 385-4. 9. HAP/OTTO FUEL SAFETY TEST PROGRAM A test program was conducted that included the following tests:
10. SAFETY ANALYSES & HAZARD EVALUATION FOR THE 155 MM, M549/8 INCH XM650 PROCESS EQUIPMENT A detailed hazard analysis was performed on a continuous TNT melt/pour facility to load 155 mm, M549/8 Inch XM650 production rounds. This analysis required engineering expertise in TNT melt/pour operations from both a safety and performance standpoint. Expertise was also required regarding the curing process of TNT in complex geometric shapes. 11. 1.5 CLASSIFICATION TESTING OF INSENSITIVE EXPLOSIVES FOR HAZARD DIVISION 1.5, U.S. AIR FORCE Up to seven (7) types of explosives were loaded into test articles to determine hazards classification for two new Air Force explosive materials. These materials were pressed using a 75-ton hydraulic press and were cast loaded using our 5-gallon melt/pour cast facility. The explosives were then subjected to extensive screening tests to determine their hazard characteristics on a small scale. In addition, extensive qualification tests were conducted to determine which of the explosives would meet the 1.5 hazards classification standards recently developed. 12. VIPER PRODUCTION PLANT CONTAINMENT VESSEL AND SHIELD DESIGN ANALYSIS Explosion output coupled with response of structures analysis was conducted to achieve optimum containment vessel and shield designs to withstand accidental explosions of rockets and high explosive charges. From this information, design criteria was established for detailed design of the protective structures. Materials, thicknesses of structures, types of structures, strengthening members and other related structure design integration parameters were established in this project. The protective structures later were successfully tested to 125% overstress. 13. HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR SARGENT YORK XM766 FUZE PRODUCTION FACILITY (1984) Subsystem hazard analyses were performed on each work center involved in the assembly of the proximity fuze. This includes the assembly of the inert electronic arming circuitry and the assembly of the explosive train sections. For the explosives area, concentrated technical support was provided for design of loading and consolidating equipment. A complete series of sensitivity tests were performed on the PBXN-5 explosive. Prototypes of the loading and consolidating equipment were tested at Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. facilities to evaluate operation for safety and product quality. A total system hazard analysis was completed for the fuze assembly process to evaluate interfacing between subsystems. The techniques of failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree analysis were used. The hazard analysis program was conducted in accordance with MIL-STD-882A and MDI-H-7048-1. 14. EQUIPMENT HAZARD ANALYSIS IN ASSEMBLY AND LOADING XM130 ROCKET PRODUCTION FACILITY (1983) A preliminary hazard analysis and total system hazard analysis were performed on equipment and procedures utilized in the load/assemble facility for rockets containing propylene oxide. Failure modes and effects analysis was used to quantify hazards. All hazards for the load/assembly facility were organized into fault trees. The program was completed in installments and new design information was submitted, in order to coordinate the hazard analysis with the completion equipment designs on a timely basis. Historical information regarding similar assembly procedures (provided by U.S. Navy) was incorporated into hazard probabilities. The hazard analyses were conducted in conformance with MIL-STD-882A. 15. PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR JAAP LOADING LINES (1983) A preliminary hazard analysis was performed on three loading lines which were used to assemble 25 mm and 30 mm rounds. The technique of failure modes and effects analysis was utilized. A blast containment analysis was performed on the explosives loading areas of the structures housing the three loading lines. Each room of the structure was evaluated in comparison to the maximum credible explosion event for the room. Several methods were utilized. The hazard analysis program was conducted in conformance with MIL-STD-882A, ARMCOMR-385-4, PBM OSM 385-1 and the AMCR Safety Manual. 16. HAZARDS CLASSIFICATION TESTS ON PBHA-1 EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL (1982) Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. performed qualification tests on PBHA-1 in accordance with the requirements of NAVORD OD 44811. Composition B was tested concurrently as a reference. The testing program included:
An engineering analysis was performed to evaluate explosion resistance of two shredders, and structures adjacent to the shredders, at a resource recovery facility. Recommendations for explosion venting, and several other design modifications, were presented to reduce the potential structural damage due to blast output and to protect personnel. Presence of solvent vapors was incorporated into the evaluation as a potential hazard. 18. PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR MLRS PRODUCTION FACILITY (1981) A preliminary hazard analysis was performed for the load assembly and packout operation for production of multiple launch rocket systems (and related submunitions). Thermal compatibility tests were conducted for compatibility of various packing materials. The hazard analysis utilized the method of failure modes and effects. Critical hazards were identifies and recommendations were made to reduce all risk values to an acceptable value. The analysis was conducted in accordance with the requirements of MIL-STD-882A, ARMCOMR 385-4 and AMCR-385-100. 19. ENGINEERING HAZARD ANALYSIS OF THE WOLVERINE BELT DRYER DESIGN Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. performed an engineering hazard analysis on a Wolverine belt dryer for use in drying ball propellant. Both the belt conveyor system and the air-handling system were evaluated for potential hazards. Hazards were quantified using a failure modes and effects analysis. Sensitivity tests were conducted on the propellant. These tests included electrostatic discharge and impact sensitivity tests. The impact sensitivity of drier belt material soaked in nitroglycerin was determined. Chemical compatibility tests were conducted on nitroglycerin and the non-metallic components of the wolverine dryer. 20. CONTINUOUS PROCESS EAK EXPLOSIVE MANUFACTURING FACILITY SUBSYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS - NAVAL ORDNANCE STATION, INDIAN HEAD, MARYLAND (1984) A complete engineering hazard analysis of a continuous EAK manufacturing facility to be built at Indian Head was conducted. This included extensive hazards testing and process analysis/testing including running of a lab scale continuous EAK process system to evaluate in-process chemical hazards relative to process variability. Failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree analysis methods were employed to yield system hazards and evaluate their criticality. 21. 155 MM/8-INCH CENTER CORE CHARGER FACILITY TOTAL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS - INDIANA ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT, CHARLESTOWN, INDIANA (1986) A total system hazard analysis, including preliminary and subsystem hazard analysis, was conducted on a 155 mm/8-Inch Center Core Charge production facility built in Charlestown, Indiana. Failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree methods were utilized to determine criticality of hazards. A quantitative risk assessment of various accident potentials was generated and compared to acceptable risk criteria. The project included extensive material sensitivity and hazards tests. 22. LITHIUM BATTERY TEST FACILITY - PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS, NAVAL WEAPONS SUPPORT CENTER, CRANE, INDIANA (1986) In accordance with MIL-STD 882B, a preliminary hazard analysis was performed to identify, evaluate and recommend controls for hazards inherent to the design and operation of the Lithium Battery and Test Facility. Extensive evaluation of the testing rooms and related equipment was conducted to determine the safest operational arrangement. In addition, an energy trace and barrier analysis was performed on the facility according to Navy specifications. This method determines the potential for inadvertent energy release that could cause damage and/or injury. By identifying potential energy sources we can identify potential hazards. Following the analysis, recommendations were made to safely separate the energy source from its target with appropriate barriers. 23. AIR CONVEYING SYSTEMS Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. has designed an analyzed several air conveying systems for propellant handling. The air conveying designs included complicated set-ups such as the transportation of propellants to and from three or more buildings at distances of more than 400 feet between buildings. Air conveying systems have been designed to safely operate at production rates of 500 lb per minute for loading and blending lines and 200 lb per minute for the unloading line. At the above mentioned production rates, concentration of powders in the airvey lines was 0.08 lb per ft3 air and 0.05 lb ft3 air, respectively. Analyses were also performed by Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. on the air conveying system from a performance and safety standpoint. In addition to design engineering efforts, hazard tests were conducted to determine the hazards levels and ignition sensitivities of hazardous materials in the process. Tests conducted were as follows:
Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. performed a hazard evaluation and designed an air conveying system that mixed cellulose acetate (CA) with an inert powder as it transported the CA to the blending. CA was mixed with the inert powder to minimize the chance of an explosion because CA was in a fine powder form which could create dust clouds. Laboratory scale tests were performed at our facility to simulate a full-scale air conveying system. From the results of the testing, a full-scale air conveying system was designed by Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. to provide maximum safety at an economical cost. 25. PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR CASE RECLAMATION FACILITY - NAVAL ORDNANCE STATION, INDIAN HEAD, MARYLAND, (1986) A preliminary hazard analysis was performed on the proposed Case Reclamation Facility at the Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, Maryland. The analysis was conducted in accordance with MIL-STD-882B. The analysis included an energy trace and barrier analysis and a failure modes and effects analysis. All phases of the degraining process were analyzed; delivery of loaded cases to the facility, degraining process, waste water treatment, and storage and removal of explosive materials. Recommendations for initiation sensitivity testing were presented to gain better knowledge of how the explosive materials will react under operating conditions. Further recommendations were made for a more detailed set of process descriptions. A preliminary hazard analysis was completed so that the safety of the workers, surrounding community and environment conditions could be maintained. See 22 for a description of energy trace and barrier analysis. 26. DETERMINE ALTERNATE TECHNIQUES TO DETONATE CHEMICAL FILLED 155MM PROJECTILES - US ARMY TOXIC AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AGENCY, ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND (1980) A study was performed to determine alternate methods for safely demiling high explosives and explosive charges in lethal chemical munitions by detonation inside an explosive containment vessel. Several systems were studied using a tradeoff analysis. The parameters of this analysis provided for an evaluation of support equipment and its costs, plus functional effectiveness, reliability and state-of-the-art status. The next step of the analysis ranked each of the potential candidate systems to determine which one was most desirable based on effectiveness, cost, reliability and potential problem areas. Of the three types of alternate systems studied, induction heating and electric arc heating in the vicinity of the projectile nose fuse interface was selected by Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. to be the most effective for use within the production operations of this agency. 27. PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS ONT HE FORT WADSWORTH NAVAL STATION - FORT WADSWORTH NAVAL STATION, NEW YORK (1986) A preliminary hazard analysis was performed on the proposed Fort Wadsworth Naval Station Public Works Facility. The analysis was conducted in accordance with MIL-STD-882B. The analysis consisted of an energy trace and barrier analysis. The analysis covered the following areas: Administration Building, Public Workshop, Construction Station, Hazardous Waste Transfer Station, Pest Control Workshops, and Vehicle Refueling Station. Recommendations included moving areas with ignition sources such as welding, electrical and other equipment from populated areas such as the administrative offices and flammable storage area. Other proprietary recommendations were also made as a result of the energy trace and barrier analysis. 28. LITHIUM BATTERY FACILITY BLAST DESIGN ANALYSIS Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. conducted an engineering blast analysis of the Naval Munitions Disassembly Facility to be located at Indian Head, Maryland. The blast analysis was conducted in accordance with the U.S. Army Corp. of Engineers Suppressive Shields Structural Design and Analysis Handbook (HNDM-1110-1-2). In this study the following items were analyzed:
Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. conducted a preliminary hazard analysis, energy trace and barrier analysis of the Lithium Battery Test and Analysis facility at the Naval Weapons Support Center in Crane, Indiana yielded an optimum building design concept which provides ease of operation without compromising safety. A one-building, one-story facility was selected which will satisfy the safety criteria, provided good controls are followed for capturing noxious gases and scrubbing them without leakage. Three safety zones, divided by two protective vapor barriers, were established to protect office personnel from potential noxious vapor leaks in test areas. Also, blast protection in the hazardous test cells and the wall adjoining the nonhazardous laboratory areas was incorporated. Vapor containment and scrubbing in the hazardous test cells will be required. Vapor alarms will be installed in all personnel occupied area, including entrances to the office area and its associated HVAC system. Over 253 hazard conditions have been identified, with appropriate corrective actions, in the upgraded preliminary hazard analysis. 30. BLAST RESISTANCE STUDY FOR PRIMARY SHREDDERS AND FUEL STORAGE BIN Safety Consulting Engineers, Inc. performed structural studies of the primary shredder and Atlas Bin designs, in view of potential vapor/dust explosions within these enclosures. A series of laboratory tests were also performed to determine the explosion output of dust/vapor mixtures. The results of the laboratory tests were used as a basis for comparing existing structural strength and the potential blast exposure. As a result of the study there is cause for concern in the vicinity of the primary shredders, due to possible failure of the side plates and back plate. The structural integrity of the bin roof should be increased to provide added blast resistance. 31. LITHIUM BOILER HAZARD ANALYSIS Hazard analysis and testing was conducted on the manufacturing of lithium boiler systems for a commercial client. Extensive evaluations of lithium boiler explosion output was made to assess the degree of hazard in the process and testing operations. |
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